According to the NTSB report, the accident aircraft, a 1975 Beechcraft F33A Bonanza, departed H. A. Clark Memorial Field Airport (KCMR) in Williams, Arizona, on January 26, 2022, at about 10:55 a.m. MST. The pilot had planned to fly to Eagle Airpark (A09) in Bullhead City, Arizona.

• READ MORE: NTSB’s ‘Flying on Empty’ Focuses on Pilot Fuel Management

The pilot reported to NTSB investigators that following departure, as the aircraft climbed through about 700 to 800 feet agl, the engine lost power and he initially attempted to turn back toward the airport. The pilot said the stall warning sounded as he began the turn, and it quickly became clear the aircraft could not glide back to the airport, so he opted to land in a field. The Bonanza “subsequently landed hard and impacted vegetation during the landing roll,” the NTSB report stated. The aircraft was substantially damaged, and the pilot sustained minor injuries.

During interviews with the NTSB, the pilot said that during previous flights he had noticed “minor heating” in two of the engine’s cylinders, which he mentioned to his mechanic. His mechanic reportedly told him to turn on the fuel boost pump to resolve the problem. According to the report, the pilot said this technique “worked great until the day of the accident.”

During the accident flight, the pilot noticed the two cylinders overheating while climbing shortly after takeoff and turned on the boost pump. The engine lost power immediately afterward.

• READ MORE: ‘Fuel Exhaustion’ Led to B-25’s Hard Landing: NTSB

The mechanic told investigators that he suggested the pilot take note of exhaust gas temperature, cylinder head temperature, and fuel flow when the problem occurred, and bring in the accident airplane for further maintenance.

“He did not recall suggesting that the pilot use the auxiliary fuel boost pump during takeoff or climb,” the report stated.

The NTSB said the probable cause of the accident was “the pilot’s activation of the auxiliary fuel boost pump shortly after takeoff, which resulted in an excess amount of fuel to the engine and a total loss of engine power.”

While some details of the pilot and mechanic’s recollection of circumstances leading up to the accident do not align, the event presents an example of how easily pilots can make mistakes when they do not follow the manufacturer’s instructions that accompany the aircraft.

Both the POH for the F33A and a placard near the auxiliary boost pump indicate the pump should be off during takeoff and turned on only during a loss of fuel pressure. Fuel pump procedures can differ significantly between aircraft, depending on the engine and fuel system. Some aircraft use auxiliary pumps for priming and little else short of an emergency.

The Continental IO-520 BA in the F33A contrasts with the Lycoming IO-540 in my airplane, which operates with the boost pump on during takeoff and landing. Such differences can be tricky for pilots who fly many different aircraft types or those who recently began flying new airplanes with fuel systems that differ from their old ones.

As is often the case with aviation accidents, the case of this F33A reflects the need for pilots to stay intimately familiar with their aircrafts’ operating manuals, systems and placarding, and to maintain a high level of formality and care when reviewing checklists before, during, and after flights.

The post Pilots Can Learn From NTSB Final Report on Bonanza Accident in Arizona appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The NTSB recently released a video of a panel discussion about the 2021 accident involving a Challenger 605 attempting a circle to land approach at Truckee-Tahoe Airport (KTRK), in Truckee, California, that resulted in the deaths of the flight crew, six passengers, and two dogs. The probable cause of the accident was released in August of this year and listed as a combination of an unstabilized approach and the flight crew’s poor crew resource management and decision making. The panel discussion took the event apart step by step to identify the issues and suggest ways to mitigate these risks.

The panel was led by NTSB board member Michael Graham. The participants included Stephen Stein, NTSB senior accident investigator of the Truckee event, Richard Meikle, executive vice president for operations and safety at Flight Safety International, Scott Snow, head of training and performance at CAE Incorporated, and three Part 135 operators, Stephen Myers, executive vice president of Elite Jets, Jeff Baum, founder and CEO of Wisconsin Aviation, and Patrick McGuire, representing commercial and business aviation safety management.

The discussion began with a review of the accident, which took place on July 26, 2021. The accident occurred in the daytime, but visibility was somewhat compromised as there was smoke in the air because of forest fires.

• READ MORE: NTSB Says Poor Decisions to Blame in Fatal Business Jet Accident

Per the 26-page NTSB report, the captain and first officer were flying a Part 135 flight fromCoeur d’Alene, Idaho, to Truckee. According to Stein, the captain was employed by Aeolus Air Charter, Inc. a Part 135 operator. The first officer was a contract pilot hired through a website. The captain had recently undergone recurrency training with the employer. It was noted that the first officer had not undergone this company training, and it was the first time they had flown together. There were references to the FO helping the captain with programming the flight management system.

According to Airnav.com, the airport elevation is 5,904 feet and the airport has two runways: Runway 11/29, measuring 7,001 by100 feet, and Runway 2/20, measuring 4,654 by 75 feet.

The cockpit voice recorder captured the flight, the crew discussing and briefing the straight-in approach to Runway 11. The NTSB report notes that most of the flight was uneventful until descent, when air traffic control told the flight crew to expect the RNAV GPS approach for Runway 20.

The captain was pilot flying and the FO was pilot monitoring the flight. Both determined that Runway 20 was too short for Challenger at its expected landing weight. The report states “Instead of making a request to ATC for the straight-in approach to Runway 11 (the longer runway), the captain told the FO they could take the Runway 20 approach and circle to land on Runway 11, and the FO relayed this information to ATC. ATC approved, and the flight crew accepted the circle-to-land approach.”

Although the descent checklist required that the flight crew brief the new circle-to-land approach, as the flight crew’s acceptance of the new approach invalidated the previous straight-in approach brief, the crew failed to brief the new approach.

The situation deteriorated from there as both the pilot and copilot were behind the airplane until it stalled short of the runway and off the centerline, resulting in a fireball that was caught on a hotel security camera.

“Briefing the approach gives you a chance to get a shared mental model between the flight crew members,” said Stein, noting that the FO at one point asked how they were going to get down from 15,000 feet to 12,000 feet in 2 nautical miles, adding that the aircraft was at 250 knots, which was too fast as they needed to be below 230 knots for the circle to land.

It was noted that ATC instructed the flight crew to hold, but “the captain was slow in complying with this instruction, so the FO started the turn to enter the holding pattern and then informed ATC once they were established in the hold.”

Approximately 20 seconds later, ATC cleared them for the approach. Before the FO confirmed the clearance with ATC, he asked the captain if he was ready for the approach, and the captain stated that he was. However, the aircraft was still too fast. The FO suggested a 360 degree turn to the captain, but the captain never acknowledged the excessive airspeed and did not turn.

The FO continued to coach the captain. Upon visual identification of the airport, the FO instructed the captain to make a turn 90 degrees to the right to put the airplane on an approximate heading of 290 degrees, which would put the aircraft parallel to Runway 11. According to the NTSB, this was consistent with the manufacturer’s operating manual procedures for the downwind leg of the circling approach.

However, the FO instructed the captain to roll out of the turn prematurely, and the captain stopped the turn on a heading of about 233 degrees which resulted in the aircraft on a 57 degree angle left of the downwind course parallel with Runway 11 and what the NTSB described as “an unnecessarily tight turning radius.”

When the aircraft began the turn to final, the airplane was still about 1.3 nm from the maximum circling radius that was established for the airplane’s approach category.The break down in cockpit communication and command structure continued, as the FO deployed 45 degrees of flaps after confirming with the captain although the manufacturer’s operating manual procedures for the downwind leg called for a flap setting of 30 degrees.

The aircraft was at 162 knots, approximately 44 knots above the landing speed of 118 knots that the crew had calculated and planned on earlier in the flight. The FO addressed this by telling the captain, “I’m gonna get your speed under control for you.”

Investigators noted that at this point it appeared as though the throttles were reduced as the engine fan speeds (N1) began to decrease from about 88 percent to about 28 percent. As the aircraft slowed, the FO repeatedly attempted to point out the airport to the captain, who appeared to be having difficulty seeing the runway – possibly due to the wildfire smoke in the area.

The FO continued to coach and reassure the captain through the circle-to-land until they entered the base leg when the FO repeatedly asked for control of the aircraft. There was no verbalized positive exchange of controls.

The jet crossed the extended centerline in a left bank and the FO remarked they were still too high. At this point one of the pilots fully deployed the flight spoilers, which increased the airplane’s sink rate. The airspeed now dropped to 135 knots, which was 17 knots above the Vref speed based on what the NTSB called “the erroneous basic operating weight programmed into the airplane’s flight management system.

The bank angle increased and the stall protection system (SPS) stick shaker and stick pusher engaged. The captain asked the FO, “What are you doing?” and the FO repeatedly asked the captain to let him have the airplane. The stick shaker and stick pusher briefly disengaged, then engaged again as the aircraft entered a rapid roll to the left consistent with a left wing stall resulting in an impact with terrain and post crash fire.

Failure to Brief

As noted in the panel discussion, the issues began with the crew’s failure to brief the circling approach. Although the FO repeatedly pointed out the aircraft was too high and too fast, the captain did not act upon this information. Because the aircraft was too fast, they did not have the time to configure the airplane and make corrections, thus reducing the safety margin.

As noted in the report, “The circling approach maneuver began at 160 kts, which was 20 kts higher than the upper limit of the circle-to-land approach speed established for this airplane’s approach category (category C) and did not drop below the category C maximum speed until the flight crew was preparing to start their base leg turn.”

It was suggested based on the conversations in the cockpit per the voice recorder that the crew did not recognize the severity of the situation and the FO was trying to salvage the approach, resulting in numerous preventable safety challenges.

What We Can Take Away From This

There are a number of lessons to be learned from this event. (Puts on flight instructor cap). For starters, be wary when flying with someone unfamiliar to you. At the airline level, pilots undergo the same training so, in theory, they understand what is expected of them during the flight and know how to work together as a crew. The role of crew members and communication of expectations have been taught and rehearsed in the simulator.

The panelists noted that when an individual undergoing training has difficulties in any of these areas, they are counseled and retrained—or removed, if the situation warrants it.

The standards of performance need to be respected and enforced, starting at the flight school level, and before each flight the CFI needs to verbalize expectations with the learner. Sadly, this often doesn’t happen because the CFI is there for their hours, not necessarily to teach—that one-off flight adds to their logbook, and the learner becomes “someone else’s problem” when the instructor moves on. This must not continue. Some CFIs are reluctant to address the learner’s shortcomings for fear of hurting their feelings or losing a client. If you choose your words carefully, you can help the client. Lying to them about their performance or using vague language like “You did okay” doesn’t help anyone one, and sets them up for a larger failure down the road.

If the instructor introduces the airman certification standards at the beginning of the lesson with the caveat “these are the minimum standards,” it puts in place the metrics for success.

The instructors must make sure the learners understand that these standards and that these metrics are established by the FAA, not the instructor or the flight school—and they are non negotiable.

CRM Training Should Begin Early

The concept of crew resource management (CRM) is a concept introduced in ground school but often not discussed or practiced in the cockpit. This can be addressed once the learner is taught how to use the checklist and perform a passenger briefing.Their job is to fly and if they need the instructor’s assistance or the instructor has to take the controls, that needs to be verbalized with the phrase “my airplane, I have the controls” or “you have the controls” and a positive exchange taking place.

The learner needs to listen to the CFI—and here’s where it gets tricky. If the learner ignores the CFI or locks up on the controls, refusing to let go, the CFIs need to do whatever it takes to get them to release.

This is a delicate area, especially when the learner is larger and physically stronger than the CFI. There may be some learners the CFI refuses to fly with because of this. While most CFIs don’t get into the cockpit with the idea they are going to physically assault the person next to them, I recall the words of my first CFI, a retired police officer who told me, “It is better to talk to twelve than be carried by six,” meaning it is better to have to explain yourself in a court of law than be buried because a learner killed you both in an accident. You do what you have to do, and hope you live to tell the story.

Use the Checklists, Brief the Approaches

The appropriate use of the checklist and a verbal briefing of the approaches should be taught and practiced from day one. When the private pilot candidate is in level flight in the practice area with the CFI at the side, the cruise flight and pre-maneuver checklist should be verbalized.

Before leaving the practice area to return to the airport, the pre-landing and approach checklist with a review of entry into the pattern including appropriate aircraft configuration, altitudes and airspeeds should be reviewed. Far too many private pilots do not follow these procedures, resulting in the “chop, drop, hope you stop (before running out of runway)” approach. Part of this review is a reminder of the sterile cockpit rule before entering the pattern, because this is a task-intensive part of the flight.

In the Truckee accident the copilot was reluctant to assert control when it was obvious that the captain was behind the airplane—for example, when the aircraft was too fast. It is understandable that you don’t want to create conflict in the cockpit, or possibly lose your job, but let’s look at the bigger picture: would you rather talk to twelve or be carried by six?

The post Lessons from the Truckee NTSB Case Study appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

As previously reported by FLYING, on August 13 both pilots ejected from MiG at low altitude during an airshow performance. The pilots sustained minor injuries in the event and were rescued from Belleville Lake. The jet came down near the Waverly on the Lake Apartments in Belleville, damaging a few cars.

The aircraft, known as a “Flogger,” was owned and flown by Dan Flier, a former U.S. Naval aviator. The aircraft had been one of the highlights at the EAA’s AirVenture in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, a few weeks earlier.

• READ MORE: The Effective, Long-Lasting MiG-21

The flight was the second-to-last act performing at the airshow staged at the Willow Run Airport (KYIP) in Ypsilanti, Michigan.

The MiG is a Russian design that uses variable-geometry wings that allow their sweep angle to be changed in flight. The jet is powered by a single turbojet engine with afterburner capability.

According to the NTSB preliminary report, the pilot reported that the flight departed from Runway 23 at KYIP, followed by a right turn to a low-level knife edge pass along Runway 23.

“Following the pass, he started banking the airplane and noticed that the engine afterburner did not ignite, and the airspeed began to decrease,” the report states. “He brought the swing wings into the fully forward position (16-degree sweep) to increase lift and began troubleshooting the problem.”

The report continues that as the pilot was actively troubleshooting the problem, the rear seat observer stated that they needed to eject. The pilot reported that he was not ready to eject and was still troubleshooting while maneuvering the airplane toward Runway 27 at Willow Run when his ejection seat fired. According to the pilot, if either occupant pulls the ejection handle, both seats eject.

The rear seat observer told the NTSB that the airplane made a pass along the runway, and the plan was to go to the left for another pass followed by a landing. However, the engine was not “accelerating.”

• READ MORE: 2 Pilots Eject from MiG-23 During Incident at Thunder Over Michigan

“He and the pilot had a brief discussion and began to climb up and gain altitude,” the report states. “They determined that they had some type of engine problem and needed to get back on the ground. He stated that they determined they did not have sufficient altitude to make it to a runway at the airport. He said they were compressed for time and needed to get out.”

When asked if he had pulled the ejection seat handles, the back seat observer stated that he could not specifically remember but thinks that he would have pulled them.

The ejection was captured on video, showing the airplane in a left bank when the ejection seats fire. The airplane continued to the left and descended into the ground, coming down about 1 mile south of the approach end of Runway 27 at KYIP. There was a postimpact explosion and fire that produced a large column of black smoke.

The fuselage and empennage containing the tail surfaces and engine came down in the parking lot next to the apartment building. The rest of the aircraft was fragmented and distributed along the ground.

It will be several months before the NTSB will conclude its investigation and issue a final report on the cause of the accident.

The post NTSB Releases Preliminary Report in Airshow MiG Accident appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

During a flight from New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport (KEVB) in Florida to Ridgeland, the aircraft’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded information indicating that the pilot in command (PIC) wanted to complete the flight as quickly as possible and arrive at the destination airport ahead of another aircraft.

According to the NTSB report, a passenger asked the crewmembers about the estimated time of arrival, and the PIC replied, “I’ll speed up. I’ll go real fast here.” A minute or so later, the second in command (SIC) noted the airplane’s airspeed was 300 knots and its altitude was 9,000 feet. For the next few minutes, the crew talked about ways to shorten the flight time, the report said. The pilots also noted that another jet on the radio was headed to 3J1.

The PIC said the other aircraft’s estimated arrival time was 10:33, local time or about two minutes ahead of the eventual accident aircraft. The CVR recorded the PIC commenting that the other jet would “slow to 250 [knots] below 10 [thousand feet] and we won’t. We know what we’re doing right now. We’re trying to win a race.” The SIC can be heard replying, “That’s right,” and the PIC said, “This is NASCAR,” after which laughter can be heard on the recording.

At Ridgeland, the crew performed a straight-in visual approach to land on Runway 36. The airplane was high and fast throughout the final approach “as evidenced by the SIC’s airspeed callouts,” per the NTSB report. The SIC asked if S-turns were necessary, and the PIC replied that they were not.

The CVR recorded an electronic voice giving repeated “sink rate” and “pull-up” warnings during the final approach, indicating the approach was not stable. The pilots continued the landing, touching down about 1,000 feet down the 4,200-foot runway. The airplane failed to stop in time, overran the runway, and came to rest in a marshy area about 400 feet beyond the departure end. The fuselage and wings sustained substantial damage, according to the NTSB.

The PIC later said the airplane’s wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and ground air brakes did not function after touchdown, but evidence from witnesses and video indicated the thrust reversers deployed shortly after touchdown. Tire skid marks indicated that wheel braking “occurred throughout the ground roll,” the report said. NTSA said the ground air brakes did not deploy, and tests performed to determine why were inconclusive.

The NTSB said the probable cause of the accident was “the flight crew’s continuation of an unstable approach and the failure of the ground air brakes to deploy upon touchdown, both of which resulted in the runway overrun. Contributing was the crew’s motivation and response to external pressures to complete the flight as quickly as possible to accommodate passenger wishes and the crew’s decision to land with a quartering tailwind that exceeded the airplane’s limitations.”

The post NTSB: Rushed Flight Contributed to Gulfstream G150 Runway Overrun appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Altitude deconflictions procedures are established in the event pilots find themselves at an improper altitude during the flight.

Six people were killed in the November 12 crash—five on the B-17G Texas Raiders and one on the Bell P-63F Kingcobra.

Both aircraft—B-17G, N7227C, and Bell P-63F, N6763—are registered to the American Airpower Heritage Flying Museum. Both were part of the Dallas, Texas-based Commemorative Air Force (CAF), a non-profit organization dedicated to preserving and showing historical aircraft. The pilots were volunteers with the CAF.

Detailed Account

The weather at the time of the accident was reported as clear skies and the winds were from 350° 14 knots with gusts to 18 knots. Video of the event shows the aircraft were flying on a northerly heading parallel to Runway 31 as part of the parade of planes.

There were two show lines—one 500 feet from the audience, the other 1,000 feet from the audience. Show lines are established to keep aircraft from flying directly over the crowd.

According to the NTSB, The P-63F was third in a three-ship formation of fighters and the B-17G was lead of a five-ship formation of bombers.

• READ MORE: NTSB Launches Probe Following Dallas Airshow Accident

According to the recorded audio for the airshow radio transmissions, the air boss directed both the fighters and bombers to maneuver southwest of the runway before returning to the flying display area, which was the designated performance area. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data shows the aircraft complied.

The air boss then directed the fighter formation to transition to a trail formation, to fly in front of the bombers, then proceed near the 500-feet show line.

The bombers were directed to fly the 1,000-feet show line.

When the fighter formation approached the display area, the P-63F was in a left bank. The fighter came up behind the B-17G, striking it on the left side just aft of the wing section. The accident happened around 1:22 p.m. in front of thousands of spectators. No ground injuries were reported.

The collision was captured on multiple smartphones from multiple angles, these videos and still photographs were quickly posted to social media. The images show the P-63F disintegrating, its parts raining down on the grassy area on airport property south of the approach end of Runway 31.

The impact cleaved the B-17G in two. The aft fuselage and empennage of the B-17G tumbled to earth while the wing and forward section of fuselage of the bomber caught fire. The forward section continued forward for a second, then cartwheeled to the ground, exploding on impact. The fire sent up thick black smoke visible for miles.

NTSB Investigation

Immediately following the accident, the NTSB dispatched a go-team to Dallas. During a press conference the day after the crash NTSB investigator Michael Graham requested anyone who had video or photographs of the accident to share them with investigators. Many spectators had already done so, giving investigators hundreds of images to scrutinize, he said.

According to the NTSB, the debris field was generally aligned on a magnetic heading of 320 degrees. Investigators spent several days mapping out, photographing and marking the wreckage. All major flight control components for both airplanes were located in the debris field. The wings from the fighter were found slightly south of the main B-17G wreckage. The empennage and rear fuselage of the B-17G was found south of the fighter’s wings.

Neither aircraft contained a black box, nor were they required to have them. Both aircraft were equipped with ADS-B and had GPS onboard. The GPS units were recovered and submitted to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory. In addition, the B-17G had an Avidyne IFD540 unit, which contained position information relevant to the accident. Investigators noted the GPSMap 496 from the fighter did not record any information for the accident flight.

The wreckage of both airplanes has been retained by NTSB for further examination.

The NTSB stressed that this information is preliminary and may change as the investigation continues. A final report on the accident is expected to be released approximately a year to 18 months from now.

The post NTSB Releases Preliminary Report on Fatal Texas Midair Collision appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

According to the final report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released Thursday, the control lock was still installed when Snodgrass attempted to take off in his SIAI Marchetti from Nez Perce County Airport (KLWS) in Lewiston, Idaho. This prevented Snodgrass from lowering the nose when the aircraft pitched up aggressively after takeoff, then entered a stall-spin situation from which it was not recovered.

The report says the airplane was equipped with a flight control-lock system that immobilized the aileron and elevator controls but still allowed for near-full movement of the rudder and tailwheel. This made it possible for the pilot to taxi the aircraft.

The flight control system consisted of a pivoting, U-shaped control lock tube mounted permanently to the rudder pedal assembly with a forward-facing locking arm mounted to the pilot’s control stick. 

The post-crash investigation found evidence that the control lock was still engaged at the time of the crash. The NTSB noted, “Had the lock been stowed during impact, it would have been pinned under the flight control stick, crushed longitudinally, and its retaining clip would have been deformed; however, the control lock and its retaining clip were essentially undamaged, and the lock was found raised off the floor.”

The report continues, “Given this information, it is likely that the control lock was installed on the flight control stick during takeoff and impact. High-resolution security camera footage of the accident revealed no discernable movement of the elevators or ailerons, further suggesting that the flight controls were immobilized by the control lock.”

Investigators noted that the pitch trim of the accident aircraft was found in an almost full nose-down position, suggesting that Snodgrass may have been attempting to use the trim to arrest the airplane’s increasing nose-up attitude due to the locked control stick. 

What Happened

Video of the June 24, 2021, accident shows Snodgrass initiating an intersection takeoff from Runway 12. The takeoff roll consists of about 400 feet before the aircraft lifts off, pitching nose-up at about a 45-degree angle. The aircraft is still climbing when at an altitude of about 80 feet agl, it then rolls 90 degrees to the left and the nose drops. The aircraft continued to roll to the left as it plunged to the ground, hitting the dirt in a nose-down attitude. There was a post-impact fire.

Snodgrass was in communication with the tower at the time of the accident. He acknowledged the takeoff clearance and an advisory for a frequency change, and then let out expletives as he lost control of the aircraft.

Snodgrass was a real-life Top Gun naval aviator, flying F-14s from carriers and later as an airshow demonstration pilot in vintage warbirds. At the time of the accident he had an estimated 6,500 hours of flight experience, of which 20 hours were in the accident airplane. 

Contemporaries of Snodgrass say he was known for being a meticulous pilot who did not rush preflight inspections.

As part of the investigation, the NTSB interviewed pilots who owned similar aircraft in regard to the control lock. It was noted that although the control lock is painted red, its orientation when engaged is difficult for a pilot to see from the cockpit.

According to the NTSB report, “A pilot who owned a similar airplane stated that he had once become distracted during preflight checks and was able to taxi, initiate takeoff, and become airborne with the control lock engaged. He stated that once he realized his mistake, removal of the lock was a struggle due to the forces imposed on the control stick during takeoff.”

The report suggests that Snodgrass did not perform a pre-takeoff control check, stating, “Had the pilot completed a functional check of the controls before initiating takeoff, the presence of the lock would have been detected and the accident would have been prevented.”

The post Crash That Killed Former Top Gun Naval Aviator Blamed on Control Lock appeared first on FLYING Magazine.